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We consider taxation by a Leviathan government and by a utilitarian government in the 
presence of heterogeneous locations within a country, when migration from one country to 
another is and is not possible. In a closed economy, a utilitarian government may transfer 
income from the poor to the rich to reduce rents earned by absentee landlords. When the rich 
are mobile, a tax on them induces little migration because the tax will reduce the rents on land 
inhabited by the rich. A race to the bottom need not appear. 
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A state or other jurisdiction which imposes high taxes on the rich may induce some residents
to move away. Such migration would appear to limit a state’s ability to redistribute income
or to ﬁnance generous social beneﬁts. The problem may generate a “race to the bottom,”
with each state attempting to attract rich residents by taxing them at a lower rate than
other states do; the equilibrium may have no redistributive taxes. Despite this theoretical
possibility, we see governments engaged in large redistribution. Migration may be limited for
several reasons: moving is costly; people prefer one location over another; property values
decline in response to higher taxes, thereby reducing the incentives to move.
This paper examines the last two considerations. In particular, we suppose that good
locations are scarce in any jurisdiction: people who want to live near the beach or on top
of a mountain with a gorgeous view will ﬁnd such locations limited.1 We shall see that a
small income tax imposed on the rich in a jurisdiction with heterogeneous locations reduces
property values in desirable locations, reduces the utility of each rich person, and increases
the utility of each poor person. Tax incidence, however, is complicated because a person’s
utility depends on three elements: his post-tax income, the rent he pays, and the location
where he lives. The incomes of rich people, after paying taxes and rents, fall, but by diﬀering
amounts. Property values also fall, hurting landlords. These results, which relate to the
research tradition in urban economics, thus extend the conventional public ﬁnance view on
1The scarcity of desirable locations may also make the property tax attractive. We focus, however, on an
income tax imposed on rich persons, with labor supply inelastic.
2taxes and migration.
We ﬁnd that incorporating the insights of urban economics, namely that taxes are partly
capitalized in property values and rents, can change some conventional results in the public
ﬁnance literature. A key insight of the literature on tax competition is that mobility of tax
payers reduces the scope for redistribution, and that governments will impose low taxes on
persons who may leave the country. This would imply that a utilitarian government which
aims to transfer income from the rich to the poor would engage in less redistribution if the
rich can emigrate. We ﬁnd instead that migration can increase redistribution. We also ﬁnd
that even when taxation does not distort labor supply, a utilitarian government in a closed
economy does not fully equalize incomes; it may even redistribute from the poor to the rich.
But a utilitarian government will not impose a regressive tax if migration is possible.
2L i t e r a t u r e
Taxes and migration The economic analysis of tax competition owes much to Tiebout
(1956). Analytic models began with studies of the incidence of local property taxation
(Mieszkowski (1972), and Zodrow (2001)). Wilson (1999) reviews the conﬂict between the
view of tax competition as wasteful and the view of it as eﬃciency-enhancing. The eﬀects
of taxes on migration is a central topic in studies of international tax competition; see, for
example, Wildasin (1994) and Sinn (1997). Christiansen, Hagen and Sandmo (1994) show
how diﬀerences in average income tax rates aﬀect migration. Though migration is inﬂuenced
by relative employment and earnings opportunities, they are considered elsewhere, and we do
3not.2 Wilson (2003) nicely summarizes and extends the results concerning property values
and land taxation.
Voting Several papers consider the tax rates that a majority of voters in a jurisdiction will
adopt; see Westhoﬀ (1977), Epple, Filimon, and Romer (1984), Epple and Romer (1991),
and Goodspeed (1989). The models assume that households diﬀer along a single dimension,
typically income. In these models, an appropriately deﬁned marginal rate of substitution
is assumed to vary monotonically across household. Use of such a monotonicity condition
on the marginal rate of substitution was ﬁrst introduced by Ellickson (1971). Under this
assumption, households will be perfectly stratiﬁed by income across jurisdictions.
Epple and Platt (1998) model local jurisdictions in which households diﬀer in both income
and tastes, and can thus generate less stark income stratiﬁcation. Hindricks (1999) considers
how redistribution aﬀects mobility, which in turn determines the identity of the voters and
the levels of redistribution they favor.
Taxes and property values The eﬀects of taxes on property values and on migration are
studied by Epple and Romer (1991). They argue that though local redistribution induces
sorting of the population, the induced changes in property values make redistribution feasible.
But whereas in Epple and Romer (1991) land is homogeneous, in our model some locations
2See Bover, Muellbauer, and Murphy (1989) for labor market aspects and Haavio and Kauppi (2002) for
the eﬀects of liquidity constraints. Cameron and Muellbauer (1998) consider commuting as an alternative
to migration. Wildasin (2003) provides a recent overview.
4are preferred to others.3 We show that this leads to diﬀerent implications even when people
have identical preferences. Epple and Platt (1998) study redistribution in a system of local
jurisdictions when households diﬀer in their preferences and in their incomes. In most models,
complete income stratiﬁcation is a necessary condition for equilibrium. In our model the
equilibrium can have rich people live in all communities.
Hansen and Kessler (2001) study the interaction of mobility and taxation, but with a
focus diﬀerent from ours. Their model explains why tax rates are lower in small countries
than in large ones. People have diﬀerent incomes and migration arises from self-selection.
In their model, the political equilibrium has rich people voting for low taxes and low grants
and poor people voting for high taxes and high grants. Their key asymmetry is geographical
size, which diﬀers between the countries. The basic diﬀerence between our model and theirs
lies in the timing of decisions: they have budgetary policy determined after people move; as
in the public ﬁn a n c et r a d i t i o n ,w eh a v et a xr a t e ss e tb yg o v e r n m e n t sb e f o r ep e o p l em o v e .
We shall analyze tax policy under two alternative assumptions of government preferences.
The ﬁrst type is a Leviathan government which maximizes tax revenue, while transferring
a ﬁxed fraction to the poor. The second type is a utilitarian government which aims to
maximize the sum of the utilities of all residents, and does so by transferring income between
the rich and the poor.
3Epple and Romer’s model is, however more general than ours in their treatment of housing: unlike them
we suppose that the size of a house and of a lot is ﬁxed.
53 Assumptions
Residents Each resident is either rich or poor. All have the same utility function. The
pre-tax income of each rich person is yR; the pre-tax income of each poor person is yP.
Land diﬀers in its location and hence in its rent. Location is indicated by e, the elevation
at which a person resides. Elevation ranges from 0 to H =1and is evenly distributed
on [0,1]. Each elevation can accommodate a density of one resident. If all the land on
the hill is occupied, the population on the hill is unity. We can view quality diﬀerences in
several ways. For example, the jurisdiction could have one hill, or else one major city. In
the hill interpretation, higher elevations oﬀer a better climate or a better view. In the city
interpretation, quality declines with distance from the city.
An individual’s utility deﬁned over consumption of goods (x) and elevation (e)i s
U = u(x)+v(e)=l n ( x)+l n ( e).
Initially, the jurisdiction has nR rich people; migration can change that number. The number
of poor residents is ﬁxed at nP; they cannot migrate. Assume that both the rich and the
poor live on the hill, and that nP +2nR ≤ 1.L a n di st h u ss u ﬃciently abundant to house all
people in the post-migration equilibrium.
Government policy Government can impose only one tax, a lump-sum of τ on each rich
person or on each poor person. Below we shall make various assumptions about how the
6revenue is redistributed. One assumption is that the government redistributes all tax revenue
from the rich to the poor. Another assumption is that government is a Leviathan, keeping
the tax revenue for its own purposes. We take a more general view, allowing the government
to keep a share α of the tax revenue for itself, and redistributing the rest. Let the number
of rich people in jurisdiction i in the equilibrium with migration be nR
i ;t o t a lt a xr e v e n u e
is then nR
i τi. Thus, the waste by the government is αnR
i τi. Let the transfer to each poor
person be t, so that aggregate transfers are
n
Pti =( 1− α)n
R
i τi.
We assume throughout t h a tt h et a xi sn o tc o n ﬁscatory: the post-tax income of a rich person




i (1 − α)
.
Migration The poor migrate neither into nor out of any jurisdiction. The rich can migrate.
This assumption is plausible for much of Europe, where language barriers are more severe for
people with less education. The reservation utility to a rich person outside the jurisdiction
is given by the standard of living abroad: no rich person will live in a jurisdiction in which
his utility is less.
7Land Housing (or land) is owned by absentee landlords. Each person within a jurisdiction
chooses where to live; the rent at elevation e is ce.
4C l o s e d e c o n o m y
4.1 No poor
Consider ﬁrst a closed economy with no poor people. Then, the rich populate locations
[1−nR,1]. In equilibrium, they all enjoy the same utility. The equilibrium rent at the lowest
occupied location, 1 − nR, is zero. (Were the rent positive, the resident would be better oﬀ
by moving to the neighboring unit with zero rent.) It follows from continuity of the utility
function that lime→(1−nR) ce =0 .T h u s ,
Lemma 1 R e n t sd e c l i n es m o o t h l yt o w a r d sz e r ow h e nm o v i n gd o w n :lime→(1−nR) ce =0 .
Above 1−nR, property owners exploit the whole surplus generated by a better location.
T h er e n ta ta n ye l e v a t i o ne>1−nR is determined by the condition that a rich person must
enjoy the same utility at diﬀerent locations occupied by the rich: ln(yR − τ − ce)+l n ( e)=
ln(yR − τ)+l n ( 1− nR),w h e r eyR − τ − ce = xR.T h i sg i v e s
ce =
(yR − τ)(e − 1+nR)
e
. (1)
The above relation determines the equilibrium rent for any given location, with ce > 0 and
c0
e > 0. Each rich person takes the rent as given when choosing his optimal location and
8consumption. The willingness to pay for housing increases increases with elevation, at the
expense of foregone consumption. At the top of the hill, the rent is c1 =( yR − τ)nR.T a x







Tax capitalization increases with elevation and with the size of the rich population.
4.2 Poor present
When poor people are present, the population is nR + nP. Residences, however, are seg-
regated: all rich people live at higher locations than do poor people. The rent paid by
a rich person in the lowest elevation occupied by the rich is determined by the willing-
n e s st op a yb yt h ep o o rf o rl o c a t i o n s1 − nR − nP <e<1 − nR. If the poor do not
pay any tax or get any transfer, the rent paid by the poor is obtained from the condition
ln(yP − ce)+l n ( e)=l n ( yP)+l n ( 1− nR − nP):
ce =
yPe − yP(1 − nR − nP)
e
, 1 − n
R − n
P <e≤ 1 − n
R. (2)





9Hence, an increase in the number of poor people hurts each rich person, who must pay
strictly higher rents at all locations. The rent at location e above this is determined by the
indiﬀerence condition
ln(y
R − τ − ce)+l n ( e)=l n ( y
R − τ −
yPnP
(1 − nR)
)+l n ( 1− n
R).
Hence, with poor people present
ce =
(yR − τ)(e − 1+nR)+yPnP
e
, 1 − n
R <e≤ 1. (4)
In the absence of a tax, the rent paid by a rich person is ce =
yR(e−1+nR)+yPnP
e .
Assume next that the government transfers a fraction 1 − α of the tax revenue to the
poor. Then each poor person receives
(1 − α)nRτ
nP .
H e n c e ,c o n s u m p t i o nb ye a c hp o o rp e r s o ni syP +
(1−α)nRτ
nP − ce = xP.W i t hs u c ha ni n c o m e




nP − ce)+l n ( e)=l n ( y
P +
(1 − α)nRτ
nP )+l n ( 1− n
R − n
P).
This indiﬀerence condition for the rental market allows us to determine the rent at the
10highest location occupied by the poor:
c1−nR =
yPnP +( 1− α)nRτ
(1 − nR)
.
This must also be the rent paid by a rich person at this elevation. Income transfers will
also increase the rents paid by all the rich people above this location. The rent paid by a
rich resident at elevation e (above where the poor live) is4
ce =
(yR − τ)e − (yR − τ)(1 − nR)+yPnP +( 1− α)nRτ
e
.
Thus the rent increases with 1 − α: the greater the fraction of tax revenue transferred to






P +( 1− α)n
Rτ.
4.3 Some rich may consume less than some poor
Without taxes, three types of equilibria can appear:
1) Each rich person consumes more than each poor person.
2 )S o m er i c hp e o p l ec o n s u m el e s st h a ns o m ep o o rp e o p l e .
3) Each rich person consumes less than some poor people.
4This can be solved from the indiﬀerence condition that the utility of all the rich has to be equal, namely
ln(yR − τ − ce)+l n ( e)=l n ( yR − τ −
yPnP+(1−α)nRτ
(1−nR) )+l n ( 1− nR).
11To establish this, note ﬁrst that the utility of each rich person is the same regardless
of whether he lives at the top of the hill or at a lower location. But the marginal utilities
from consumption and location diﬀer. At the top, the marginal utility from consumption is
large but from elevation is small. Moreover, the utility of each rich person from location,
ln(e), is higher than that of any poor person. As a rich person pays a higher rent, his utility
from consumption, ln(x) can be less than that of a poor person. At the elevation 1 − nR,
the utility of the rich and the poor from location are equal and they pay an equal rent;
the rich person enjoys a higher utility from consumption than does his neighboring poor
person. At higher elevations, however, rents are higher and the utility from consumption of
a rich person can be smaller than the utility of a poor person. A condition for this can be
derived by comparing the utilities from consumption of the highest rich person and lowest
poor person. When τ =0 , the rent paid by the rich at the top is yRnR + yPnP. Then the


















1−nR)/∂nR > 0 and ∂(1+nP
1−nR)/∂nP > 0,w eﬁnd that with a given yP and yR,w h e n
nP and nR are large this inequality holds: a rich resident at the top consumes less than a
poor person at the bottom. To see why, consider an increase in the poor population. The
12poor must live at the bottom, in locations previously unoccupied. This, however, means that
the rents at higher elevations occupied by the poor must increase. The rich person living
next to the poor person must also pay a higher rent. But then, for equal utilities, rents paid
by the rich at higher elevations must also rise.
Consider next an increase in the rich population. Some rich people will now live at the
higher elevations that had been occupied by the poor, inducing the poor to occupy yet lower
elevations. The lowest poor person consumes as much as before, but suﬀers from living at a
lower elevation. The poor person at the highest elevation occupied by the poor must suﬀer
the same utility loss: he loses utility from residing at a lower elevation than he had before
the number of rich people increased. This can be seen as follows. With τ =0the rent paid





At the lowest residence of a rich person, e =1− nR,a n dce = yPnP/(1 − nR).T a k i n gt h e
derivative, ∂(
yPnP
1−nR)/∂nR > 0. Thus the rent paid by the lowest rich person rises. Therefore,
all the rich throughout the hill must pay a higher rent. The greater the increase in the
distance between the lowest rich person and the highest rich person, the greater the drop in
consumption of goods by the rich at the top.
Even though a rich person may consume less goods than some poor persons, the utility





)+l n ( 1− n
R) < ln(y














This can never hold. Nevertheless, consumption of goods by the lowest rich person may be
less than that of the lowest poor person. That is, in equilibrium it can hold that ln(yR −
yPnP
(1−nR)) < ln(yP),o rt h a tyP >y R(1−nR)/(1+nP −nR),f o rnP +nR >> 0). If nP > 0 this
c a nh o l de v e ni fyR >y P. Intuitively, if any income group is large, equilibrium rents may be
high, reducing consumption by the rich.
Lemma 2 A large population of the makes for high rents, thereby reducing consumption by
the rich.
4.4 Optimal tax in a closed economy
4.4.1 Leviathan government
Suppose the government maximizes tax revenue, subject to the constraint that it must return
an exogenous fraction 1−α of the tax revenue to the poor. In a closed economy, this amounts
to maximizing the tax rate subject to the condition that the post-tax income of an initially
rich person exceeds the post-transfer income of an initially poor person.
144.4.2 Utilitarian government
Assume instead a benevolent utilitarian government which transfers all tax revenue to the
poor (α =0 ), maximizing aggregate utility. If rents and residences would stay constant,
this would amount to ﬁnding the tax rate on the rich which makes the marginal utilities
across people equal. With endogenous rents, this cannot be achieved with a uniform tax
on the rich and a uniform transfer to the poor. The reason is that the marginal utility
from consumption depends on rents paid, which diﬀer by location. Equalizing aggregate
utility within each group requires diﬀerences in utility from consumption to compensate for












nP − ce(τ)) + v(e)]de.
We note that a person’s marginal utility from consumption and the eﬀect of a tax on his
rent and on his consumption depend on where he lives. A rich person living at the top of
the hill pays a high rent, may consume little, and so may have a higher marginal utility of
consumption than does a poor person. This can make a negative tax, with a transfer from
the poor to the rich, optimal.
Consider a per capita tax τ imposed on each rich person. The optimal tax for a utilitarian

























Social optimality then requires that the tax equalize the sum of the weighted marginal




xP , but weighted by the






































The optimal tax equalizes the weighted sum of the marginal utilities of consumption across
income earners, adjusted for the diﬀerential direct and indirect tax eﬀects on rents and hence
on consumption.
To evaluate this social optimality condition requires considering the eﬀect of taxation
and transfers on rents. Finding the optimal tax rate, however, is simpliﬁed by recognizing
the key property of the model that the rents adjust so that, in equilibrium, citizens with
the same income enjoy the same utility regardless of their location. It is also useful to note
that the utility of all the poor must equal that of the poor person paying zero rent. Thus,
to determine the optimal tax rate, it suﬃces to derive the eﬀect of the tax on the resident
at the lowest location in each income class. Social welfare is then the product of the size of
16each income group and the utility of any member in that group, say of the person at the






The utility of the poor person living at the lowest elevation is
U
P =l n ( y
P +
nRτ
nP )+l n ( 1− n
R − n
P)
=l n ( ( y
P +
nRτ
nP )(1 − n
R − n
P)).
The utility of the rich person living at a lower elevation than any other rich person is
U
R =l n ( y
R − τ −
yPnP + nRτ
(1 − nR)
)+l n ( 1− n
R)
=l n ( ( y




























nP )(1 − n
R − n
P)).
17The ﬁrst-order condition for maximizing this social welfare is6
n
R −1




















The optimal tax depends on the incomes yP and yR a n do nt h ep o p u l a t i o ns i z e snP and nR.
Proposition 1 A utilitarian government may impose either a positive or a negative tax on
the rich.
Proof. From (5), τ ≷ 0 ⇐⇒ yR/yP ≷ 1+nP
1−nR.
A negative tax means that the government transfers from the poor to the rich. The
condition that the after-tax income of the rich is not smaller than the after-transfer income
of the poor translates into the condition
τ ≤
nP(yR − yP)
nR + nP (6)
The condition that τ in (5) fulﬁlls (6) is satisﬁed. We ﬁnd an even stronger result that
Proposition 2 A utilitarian government does not fully equalize incomes.
6The second-order condition reveals that this gives the wage tax rate maximizing SWF.
18Proof. We show that the tax rate chosen by a utilitarian government is less than
nP(yR−yP)













nR + nP .
This reduces to the condition nPyP + nRyR > 0,w h i c ha l w a y sh o l d s .
To gain further understanding of utilitarian taxation, assume that yR =1and that
nP =0 .2.T h e ﬁrst normalization is without loss of generality. The second assumption







If this condition is not satisﬁed, then a utilitarian government transfers from the poor to the
rich.
Thus, a utilitarian government does not fully equalize the incomes of the rich and the
poor, and may even transfer income from the poor to the rich. Moreover, the optimal
utilitarian tax policy does not equalize the marginal utilities of consumption across citizens.
Rather, it is optimal to equalize the marginal utility of disposable income weighted by the
shares of population and the marginal tax eﬀects on consumption.
The intuition for the result relates to the insight made by Mirrlees (1972). He shows that
when otherwise identical people live in diﬀerent locations and so spend diﬀerent amounts on
transportation, diﬀerent people will have diﬀerent marginal utilities of income. Maximizing
19social welfare calls not for equalizing incomes, but for equalizing the marginal utilities of
income. In other words, even with identical people, inequality of income distribution is
part of the social optimum. In our model, the rich may consume less than the poor, and
so enjoy a higher marginal utility of consuming goods; maximizing social welfare would
then call for transfers to the rich. Another explanation for our ﬁnding lies in the property
market. By transferring income from the poor, the government reduces the rents that these
are willing to pay. This, in turn, directly reduces the rent paid by each rich person. Thus,
by transferring income from the poor to the rich, the government reduces rents and thus
increases consumption by some people.
We can also consider a utilitarian government which chooses diﬀerent weights for diﬀerent






nP )(1 − n
R − n
P)).
Then, not surprisingly, as ∂SWF
∂τ > 0: unlike an equal-weighting utilitarian government, a
Rawlsian government would equalize the after-tax income of all citizens. This naturally
satisﬁes the constraint that the post-tax income of the rich does not fall below that of the
poor.
205O p e n e c o n o m y
5.1 Migration
We now turn our attention to migration between countries. Assume two countries, a and
b with nR rich people in each country. Migration is costless and people exhibit no home-
country preference. Each jurisdiction has nP ≥ 0 poor citizens, who do not migrate. Taxes
are paid in the jurisdiction where the citizen resides. Then a domestic tax on the rich creates
an incentive to emigrate abroad. We thus make the lowest locations occupied in each country
endogenous. To ensure suﬃcient space in each jurisdiction for immobile domestic poor and
mobile rich from both jurisdictions, we assume that nP +2 nR ≤ 1.A s w e a r e c o n c e r n e d
with tax competition, in our time line governments simultaneously choose their tax rates;
people observe the tax rates when deciding to migrate.
The government redistributes a fraction 1−α of tax revenue to the poor. This generates
a feed-back between taxation and migration of the rich. The larger the transfer to the poor,
the higher the poor bid rents. This in turn makes the jurisdiction less desirable to the rich.
Thus, we expect more people to migrate in response to any given tax diﬀerence the greater
the fraction of tax revenue the government transfers to the poor. But counteracting this,
migration of the rich reduces transfers to the poor, thus reducing their willingness to pay for
good locations. This in turn limits migration in response to a given tax diﬀerence.
The migration equilibrium for any given tax is determined by a simultaneous system of
six equations. These are per capita transfers to the poor and the rents paid by the rich
21at the lowest elevation that they occupy in the two countries, population identity, and the
arbitrage condition that the utility of the rich is the same in the two jurisdictions.





The arbitrage condition in the rental market gives the rent paid by the poor in country






i )+l n ( 1− n
R
i ) (9)








This condition states that the utility of the poor living at the highest location occupied by
the poor equals the utility of the poor living at the lowest occupied location (where the rent
is zero). Equation (9) yields
c1−nR
i =





Population identity states that the sum of post-migration rich populations equals the







The arbitrage condition imposed by migration by the rich across the two jurisdictions
22states
ln(y
R − τa − c1−nR
a )+l n ( 1− n
R
a)=l n ( y
R − τb − c1−nR
b )+l n ( 1− n
R
b ). (12)
The arbitrage conditions in the rental market state that the utility of a rich person is
the same at all locations occupied by the rich, so it suﬃces to present migration equilibrium
as equating utilities of arbitrarily chosen rich individuals in the two countries. We choose
those rich people living at the lowest elevation occupied by rich people in each country. As
utility functions are continuous functions of elevation, rents are also continuous. Thus, the
rent paid by the rich at the border between the rich and the poor equals the rent that would
be paid by a poor person at the same location. Substituting c1−nR
a and c1−nR
b from (10) and
inserting (11), we can solve from the migration arbitrage condition the post-migration rich




(yR − τa) − (yR − τb)(1 − 2nR)+( 1− α)2nRτb
2yR − ατa − ατb
. (13)




(yR − τb) − (yR − τa)(1 − 2nR)+( 1− α)2nRτa
2yR − ατa − ατb
. (14)
Note that (13) and (14) do not depend on the number of poor persons. Though migration
depends on the share of tax revenue transferred to the poor, it does not depend on how many
23poor receive the transfer.7 If there are no poor persons, then α must equal 1. Equations





(yR − τa) − (yR − τb)(1 − 2nR)







(yR − τb) − (yR − τa)(1 − 2nR)
2yR − τa − τb
. (16)
5.2 Nash equilibria with tax competition
5.2.1 Leviathan governments
A government which aims to maximize its tax revenue in a closed economy raises the tax
rate to equalize the after-tax income of the rich and the poor. In an open economy, the
ability of the rich to emigrate imposes an additional constraint. Therefore, even a revenue
maximizing government may choose a tax rate that leaves incomes unequal: potential mi-
gration by the rich disciplines government, as suggested by Brennan and Buchanan (1980).
With endogenous property values, this intuition needs to be re-examined. This is our agenda
here.
Assume that each government maximizes its tax revenue, subject to the constraint that
the post-tax income of a rich person exceeds the post-transfer income of a poor person, and
that a fraction 1 − α of tax revenue is transferred to the poor. If there are no poor, then
7Recall, however, the requirement that the rich cannot be made poorer than the poor.




(yR − τa) − (yR − τb)(1 − 2nR)+( 1− α)2nRτb
2yR − ατa − ατb
.
Maximizing with respect to the tax rate, τa, yields the ﬁrst-order condition








By the negativity of the second-order condition, the ﬁrst-order condition yields tax rates
maximizing tax revenue. In a symmetric equilibrium, τa = τb = τN.T h eﬁrst-order condi-














This leads to a second-order algebraic equation in the tax rate. The only solution satisfying






We see that an increase in the share of tax revenue government retains reduces the tax in both
countries. For intuition, recall that each government aims to maximize the product of ατi
and nR
i ,i ∈ {a,b}. For any given tax rate assumed to be chosen by the other government,
a decrease in the country’s tax rate increases the tax base by encouraging immigration, but
25reduces the tax revenue collected from the initial tax base. Each government balances these
eﬀects. For any given tax rate, an increase in α increases the value to the government of
each taxpayer, thus intensifying incentives to compete for tax payers. Each government then
gains from reducing the tax on the rich. A government which imposed a high tax would lose
tax base to the other government which imposes a lower tax. The Nash equilibrium in tax
rates thus requires lower tax rates in both economies. To summarize.
Proposition 3 Assuming that the Leviathan government is not constrained by (6), the op-
timal tax on the rich increases with the share of tax revenue transferred to the poor.
Proof. The result follows from ∂τN/∂α < 0.
It remains to verify that the tax rate is not so high that it would make the after-tax
i n c o m eo ft h er i c hb el e s st h a nt h a to ft h ep o o r .T h i sr e q u i r e st h a t
α ≥
2nRyR(nP + nR) − nP(yR − yP)
nRnP(yR − yP)+nR2nRyR .
Were α low, the government would transfer much of its tax revenue to the poor in each
country. The required condition may then be violated. On the other hand, high α helps
satisfy this condition for the further reason that it encourages the governments to lightly tax
the rich.
If the governments transfer all revenue (α =0 ), the tax rate is τ =m i n ( 2 nRyR,
nP(yR−yP)
nP+nR ),
where 2nRyR is from (17) and
nP(yR−yP)
nP+nR is the tax rate when incomes of the rich and the
poor are fully equalized after taxes and transfers.
26For (6) not to bind, we must have 2nRyR ≤
nP(yR−yP)
nP+nR .
The ﬁndings suggest that when each government aims to maximize its revenues, tax
competition does not lead to a race to the bottom. This can be veriﬁed from (17) with
strictly positive tax rate τN =
2nRyR
nRα+1 > 0 for all 0 ≤ α ≤ 1. This result arises from the
rental markets when desirable locations are scarce, so that the tax is capitalized in rents.
The fall in rents ensures that diﬀerences in taxes do not lead to corner solutions with all the
rich moving to the country with a lower tax. In the absence of a rental market and of land
scarcity, tax competition would lead to zero tax rates. But in our model the equilibrium tax
is positive.
We summarize with
Proposition 4 Even when the rich are mobile, taxes do not show a race to the bottom.
Capitalization of taxes in rents which makes landlords bear some of the tax burden, and
migration which raises rents in the destination country, reduce the incentives to migrate.
With identical jurisdictions, the equilibrium has no migration. The equilibrium tax on the
rich is either equal to or lower than it would be in a closed economy.
For numerical illustration, let yR =1and nP =0 .2. This limits the number of the rich to
0 <n R ≤ 0.4, thus letting us analyze the cases where the relative number of the rich varies
from arbitrarily low values to twice the number of the poor. The tax is then
τ =
2nR, if yP ≤ 1 − 2nR − 10(nR)2
1−yP
1+5nR, if yP > 1 − 2nR − 10(nR)2
(18)
27If instead each government retains all the tax revenue, the tax rate is τ =m i n (
2nRyR
nR+1 ,yR−
yP). For our numerical values,
τ =
2nR
1+nR, if yP ≤ 1−nR
1+nR
1 − yP, if yP > 1−nR
1+nR
. (19)
Therefore, a Leviathan government chooses a higher tax when it redistributes to the poor
if the income of the poor is suﬃciently low; it chooses a higher tax when it retains all the
tax revenue if the income of the poor is suﬃciently high. We summarize these results as
Proposition 5 If the income of the poor is suﬃciently low, then tax competition between
Leviathan governments leads to a higher tax rate if the governments distribute their tax
revenue to the poor. If the income of the poor is suﬃciently high, then tax competition
between Leviathan governments leads to a higher tax rate if the governments do not distribute
their tax revenue to the poor.
We notice that the tax equilibrium may diﬀer if the government in either jurisdiction
has other objectives. For example, the government in one jurisdiction may maximize tax
revenue, while the other has a Rawlsian welfare function.
285.2.2 Utilitarian governments
Assume instead that each government maximizes the utility of citizens initially living in the
country.8 Our qualitative results do not depend on the particular functional form of the
utility function assumed below, but hold for any linear transformation of it.
In choosing the tax, a government must take into account the public budget constraint,
the eﬀects of a tax on rents, and migration responses that equalize the utility of the rich
between the two jurisdictions. A heavy tax on the rich reduces their utility, and causes
their emigration, thus reducing tax revenue from them. But the emigration of the rich can
also reduce rents paid by the poor and let the poor live at better locations. The eﬀects of
mobility by the rich on the optimal utilitarian tax is ambiguous a priori.
To ﬁnd the optimal tax, we must ﬁrst determine the migration responses by the rich and
the equilibrium in the rental market. These are derived in the previous section. The social









R − τa − c1−nR
a )+n
R ln(1 − n
R
a).
8This assumption is needed because if the government maximizes the sum of the utilities of citizens living
in the country after migration, and if the utility functions would have negative values, then each government
would want a zero population.






































nP(−2τa + τb +2 nRyR)
2yRnPyP − τ2
a + τaτb +2 τanRyR
+
nP
2yR + τa − τb − 2nRyR − 2yRnP
+
−nR
2yR − τa − τb − 2nRyR − 2yPnP .
The analysis of Nash equilibria must distinguish between solutions in which the condition
that the tax cannot make the after-tax income of the rich less than the after-transfer income
of the poor does or does not bind. This condition is given by τ ≤
nP(yR−yP)
nR+nP .W h e n t h i s
condition does not bind, we can simplify by using the symmetry property that τa = τb = τ:
nP(−τ +2 nRyR)
2yRnPyP +2 τnRyR +
nP
2yR − 2nRyR − 2yRnP (20)
+
−nRyR
(yR(2yR − 2τ − 2nRyR) − 2yRyPnP)
=0 .
30Numerical analysis gives our main result:
Proposition 6 Utilitarian governments may choose either lower or higher taxes on the rich
when migration is possible than when it is not.
Proof. We prove existence with numerical examples exhibiting the claimed qualitative
results. If nP = nR = yP =0 .1 and yR =1 , the optimal tax in a closed economy (with
migration not possible) is 0.395; the optimal tax under tax competition (with migration
possible) is 0.195.I f nP = nR =0 .1, yP =0 .5 and yR =1 , the optimal tax in a closed
economy is 0.175, and the optimal tax under tax competition is 0.183.
It is no surprise that migration (or tax competition) can lead to lower taxes: the ability of
the rich to migrate constrains the government’s ability to tax them. But the opposite result
appears novel and surprising. The reason tax competition can increase tax rates is because of
the eﬀects that appear in the rental market for land. Emigration by rich tax payers reduces
competition for desirable locations and so reduces rents. The reduced rents beneﬁtt h ep o o r ,
either because they pay lower rents, or because they live in better locations. The immigration
of the rich, on the other hand, generates two eﬀects for the receiving country. Rich migrants
generate more tax revenue. But they also bid up rents. When the rent eﬀect dominates, a
utilitarian government would prefer to induce part of the domestic rich to migrate to the
other country. As symmetric countries choose in a Cournot-Nash equilibrium identical tax
rates, there is no migration in equilibrium. A government, however, may impose a higher
tax than in a closed economy. Thus, the ability of the rich to avoid taxes by migrating hurts
them by inducing both countries to impose higher taxes.
316C o n c l u s i o n
The urban economics view of taxation and migration complements the traditional public
ﬁnance view of taxation with mobility. The fall in property values reduces the incentive of
the rich to migrate, thereby allowing for more redistributive taxation than is predicted by
standard models in public ﬁnance. Our paper established two conditions that together create
scope for income redistribution from the rich to the poor even in the absence of mobility costs
or complementarities between the rich and the poor: (i) the scarcity of desirable locations,
and (ii) lower willingness to pay by the poor for favorable locations. If either condition fails
the scope for redistribution is limited.
We found that when rents are endogenous, a utilitarian government in a closed economy
may redistribute from the poor to the rich. The intuition is that by taxing the poor, the
government reduces rents that both the poor and the rich pay. The resultant utility gains
may exceed the decline in consumption by the poor. Related to this, we also ﬁnd that some
or, in some cases even all, the rich may consume less non-housing goods than do the poor.
The marginal utility of consumption for a rich person may exceed the marginal utility of
consumption for a poor person, further justifying transfers to the rich.
When the rich can migrate, and government disregards the welfare of landlords, a utili-
tarian government may impose a higher tax than when the rich cannot migrate. The result
can arise because a tax which induces emigration by the rich reduces demand for desirable
locations, allowing the poor to pay lower rents or to enjoy better locations. The increased
number of rich people in the other country can also generate an externality, reducing the
32welfare of the poor in that country. Tax competition can then lead both countries to tax the
rich more heavily than they otherwise would. Though such a strong result does not always
apply, it suggests that accounting for responses in the housing market can reverse common
views on the eﬀects of migration on income redistribution.
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